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This paper uses a cognitive theory of firms and organizations, with a focus on learning 
and innovation. Here, cognition is a wide notion, including value judgments and 
corresponding feelings and emotions. This paper focuses on the relation between that 
cognitive theory and Penrose’s theory of the growth of the firm. As in Penrose’s work, 
the focus is on learning, rather than on efficient utilization of resources or appropriation 
of returns from them. Also as in Penrose, the underlying view of cognition is a 
constructivist one, according to which people with different experience view the world 
differently. So far, the paper is consistent with Penrose. However, it also adopts and 
further develops some of the criticism of her views, concerning the role of other human 
resources than managers in organizational learning, problems of conflicts of interest and 
governance within the firm, dynamic capabilities for developing new capabilities, and, 
above all, the alternative of collaboration between firms, for learning and innovation, in 
the combination of capabilities between rather than within the firm. In particular, it 
argues that, in contrast with Penrose, there are limits to firm size.  
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The central question of this paper is: what are the sources of innovation? Beyond the 
efficient utilization of resources, and appropriability of their returns, it focuses on their 
creation. While this may seem new from the perspective of recent economic theory, 
which has focused on efficient or profitable use of existing resources, some scholars have 
shown that the question of resource creation goes back as far as Adam Smith, for whom 
division of labour and new resource creation went together. Best (2002: 179) quoted 
Smith as connecting division of labour with ‘new improvements of art’.  
Penrose (1959) suggests that the sources of innovation lie in firms (Pitelis 2002). 
However, while Penrose’s account of the growth of the firm includes managerial 
learning, in the discovery and utilization of as yet unutilized potential of existing 
resources, and suggests that this moves on to the development or adoption of new 
resources, it hardly shows how the latter is done. In other words, dynamic capabilities are 
assumed rather than analysed. To use the terminology of exploitation and exploration   2
(March 1991), Penrose showed how firms learn new ways to exploit resources, but hardly 
showed how exploration of new resources takes place, and what the problems and limits 
of that are, within the firm. Goshal et. al. (2002: 291-292) distinguished between 
Penrosian growth, in what the firm can do, and Schumpeterian growth in what would be 
possible to do. 
According to Adam Smith, discovery is a process in both markets and firms. 
According to Hayek (1945), knowledge is dispersed, which suggests that the variety of 
views needed for exploration, on what might be possible to do, largely lies dispersed 
outside firms. According to Schumpeter (1934), firms are needed to shelter novel 
entrepreneurial vision from established practice and ideas, which cannot make sense of 
such vision, to give it a chance to develop (Ghoshal et al. 2002). Here, as in Penrose, 
from the beginning the crux of the firm lies not in efficient utilization but in innovation, 
and the theory of the firm is also a theory of entrepreneurship.   
Building on these views, in a nutshell my view is as follows. Assuming that 
innovation arises from ‘novel combinations’, as Schumpeter (1909, 1934) proposed, two 
questions arise: where do the elements to be combined come from, and where does the 
combination occur? My answer will be as follows. The elements for novelty come from 
markets (knowledge indeed being dispersed, as Hayek claimed), firms serve to provide a 
niche for entrepreneurial vision (as Schumpeter proposed) and to carry it into realization, 
in ongoing novelty of combinations of potential services offered by resources (as Penrose 
proposed). Here, I am bringing together Hayek, Schumpeter and Penrose, one could say. 
They all share a notion of differential cognition, i.e. different people having different 
perceptions, views, and understandings, and that is also a cornerstone in my approach.    
The basic idea behind my theory is the Schumpeterian view that a firm serves to 
establish and implement a particular cognitive focus, setting it apart from the variety of 
views outside the firm. This view can also be seen as going back to Marshall, who saw 
the firm as a form of organization that manages and develops knowledge (Loasby 2002, 
Foss 2002, Richardson 2002). However, cognitive focus causes myopia, and while it 
enables the implementation of a novel view, it also limits the innovative potential of the 
firm in novel views. Innovation requires a view of novelty plus the ability to implement it 
(Ghoshal et al. 2002). A view requires implementation but implementation requires a 
limitation of view. To repair for this myopia, firms need complementary cognition from 
relations with outside firms with a different cognitive focus (Nooteboom 1992). In this 
way, next to learning, innovation and entrepreneurship, inter-firm collaboration also 
forms an integral part of my theory of the firm. 
This paper can only present part of a cognitive theory of the firm, and it focuses on 
the relations of this theory with that of Penrose. It builds on Penrose, and goes beyond her 
view of the firm. In particular, it extends learning beyond management, analyzes in more 
detail how capabilities are combined and developed, extends the analysis of the limits to 
size and growth of the firm, and includes inter-firm collaboration as an integral part of the 
theory of the firm, showing how it complements the firm. While Penrose concludes that 
there are no limits to size, I argue that there are. The limits to the growth rate of the firm 
resulting from the present analysis are similar to those suggested by Penrose, but add 
some to it.  
In a first section, the paper summarizes the views of Penrose, some points of 
criticism, and resulting issues to be discussed in this paper. Next, it sets out the arguments   3
for the need for organizational cognitive focus, specifies features of such focus, and the 
resulting role for organizations. In a third section, it discusses the origin and stability of 
cognitive focus, different levels of organization, and limits to the size and growth of the 
firm, in a trade-off between integrating capabilities in a firm and connecting capabilities 
between firms.  
 
 
Penrose and dynamic capabilities 
 
Penrose (1959) proposed that firms achieve competitive advantage on the basis of 
organization-specific resources. It is not the resources themselves that yield results but 
the services that they may render. As they employ the firm’s resources, managers 
discover new ways of employing them, in novel combinations, in response to 
entrepreneurial views of opportunities, and this provides a basis for ongoing growth of 
the firm. Such entrepreneurial views are cognitive constructions that are unlike objective 
reflections of reality, vary between people, and are therefore idiosyncratic. This view 
goes back to Boulding (1956), among others. The present article similarly adopts a 
cognitive constructivist view, yielding variety of cognition between people. People 
construct their cognitive categories of perception, understanding and evaluation in 
interaction with other people. As a result, people view the world differently, yielding 
‘cognitive distance’ to the extent that they have developed their cognition along different 
life trajectories (Nooteboom 1992, 2000). 
Penrose (1959) proposed that the size of the firm is not constrained. Firm size is not 
constrained by limits to economies of scale, or diseconomies of scale, related to products 
or the size of their markets, since firms can expand by adding new products to their 
portfolio. Nor are there diseconomies of scale in management. Firm resources are never 
completely utilized, and yield scope for further extension of activities and capabilities. 
Penrose proposed that the rate of growth of the firm is constrained by the scope of 
managerial resources, in particular the ability of existing management to select and 
introduce additional management and the rate at which such incoming management can 
adapt to existing plans, procedures etc. She noted that diversification is limited by the 
need to maintain necessary integration with the rest of the firm, and avoid bureaucracy 
(op cit.: 208), and that thus there is a crucial trade-off between speed of expansion and 
maintenance of control (op cit: 189), in a ‘fundamental ratio of managerial resources 
available for expansion’. 
However, Penrose neglected other problems involved in continued expansion of 
resources and capabilities, internally or by merger or acquisition, the need to also divest, 
the need to maintain focus, and alternative opportunities of growing by collaboration with 
other firms rather than by expansion, as has been widely recognized in the literature 
(Pitelis 2002). Corresponding with this, Penrose had too rosy a view of the capabilities of 
large firms, and neglected the potential of smaller firms. While Penrose’s account fitted 
well with the development of capitalist firms in her day, since then there is much 
evidence of de-conglomeration, downsizing, divestment and sharpening of focus. Kay 
(2002) documents how the Hercules company, which was a central source of inspiration 
for Penrose, in its later development ran into failed diversification and had to divest and 
to shift its core. Cantwell (2002) showed the need for coherence in the technological and   4
productive activities of the firm to continue to innovate. Lazonick (2002) showed how 
after the wave of conglomeration in the nineteen-sixties and early seventies, from the 
nineteen-eighties large corporations reduced their range of activities, and how in the ‘new 
economy’ firms focused on concentrated skill bases. Patel and Pavitt (1997, 1999, 2000) 
showed, on the basis of technological profiles constructed from patent data, that while 
firms indeed incorporate a considerable scope of technological areas, as predicted by 
Penrosian theory, the profiles of firms are remarkably stable, indicating limited changes 
of composition outside a given focus of technological areas. Thus, the empirical evidence 
indicates that while there may indeed be a wide scope for combining complementary 
capabilities, scope, and hence the size of the firm, is subject to limits.  
Therefore, in contrast with Penrose I will argue that from the perspective of 
organization as a cognitive focusing device, and from a perspective of dynamic 
capability, there are limits to firm size. As a firm grows by adding new activities, at some 
point it will have to add new capabilities, and as it continues to do so it will dilute its 
focus too much, slow down its rate of innovation and reduce its flexibility for novel 
configurations of capabilities, compared to opportunities for engaging in more variable 
and more exploratory patterns of collaboration with other organizations, in alliances and 
networks.  
A second well-known point of criticism of Penrose that I share concerns the exclusive 
role that she accorded to management, in the identification of opportunities and in the 
learning of new uses of resources (Pitelis 2002). Since the time when Penrose wrote her 
book, here also considerable change has occurred, in growing skepticism as to how 
managers would be able to identify new opportunities better than staff that actually 
operate technology, and interact with customers and suppliers. Nowadays, we are more 
inclined to accord innovative potential to human resources more generally. I propose that 
there is a corresponding shift in the task of management. The central task no longer lies 
in identifying opportunities and guiding novel combinations, but, I propose here, on a 
meta-level of managing cognitive focus in order to enable people to understand each 
other and collaborate with each other, in their identification and implementation of 
opportunities, and to set cognitive focus in answer to the question how to combine 
exploitation and exploration, within or between organizations. In other words, managerial 
resources are seen as lying primarily in guiding and coordinating cognition in the firm.  
I accept Penrose’s view concerning the limit to the growth rate of the firm, with the 
difference that I focus on human resources more widely, discounting managerial ability 
to know and foresee all, so that the constraint becomes that of incorporating new staff 
more generally. The question is what, more precisely, it is that takes time for incoming 
staff to adapt to. Penrose (op. cit: 206) proposed that the growth of total supply of 
management services is faster than growth of the firm, up to a point, and then possibly 
declines. Why would that be? The view given in the present paper is similar to that of 
Penrose, but more specific, in that the firm, and organizations more widely, are seen as 
limited by the ability to coordinate cognition in the firm, and new entrants to the firm, 
whether managers or other staff, need to adapt to what I call the cognitive focus of the 
firm.  
A third well-known point of criticism of Penrose that I share is the neglect of internal 
conflict of interests and views, and corresponding problems of authority, monitoring, 
control, incentives and motives. In other words, a theory of the firm should include not   5
only issues of competence but also issues of governance. In my theory, that is included in 
organizational focus, which has a competence side, for mutual understanding, and a 
governance side, for ability and willingness to collaborate.   
With her view of organization-specific resources, Penrose inspired a stream of 
‘resource’, ‘competence’ or ‘capability’ based theories of the firm, in the management 
and organization literature. In the literature, that view is claimed to stand in contrast with 
the ‘market positioning view’ attributed to Porter (1980, 1985), derived from industrial 
organization economics.   
However, it has been claimed, e.g. by Foss (2002) and Goshal et al. (2002), that most 
of the resource/competence/capability literature focuses not on learning and the creation 
of new resources but on the utilization of resources once they are created, in particular on 
appropriability by some ‘isolating mechanisms’ from competitors, and thereby is closer 
to traditional industrial organization economics and Porterian views than they make out, 
while ‘Penrose stresses entrepreneurship and learning in world characterised by change 
and uncertainty’ (Foss 2002: 156). Also, that literature did not implement Penrose’s view 
of cognitive differentiation between people. Hence, since this paper focuses on resource 
creation, innovation and learning, and cognitive differentiation, I will not include most of 
the literature based on the Resource or Competence based View. However, here and in 
the further development of a cognitive theory of the firm, beyond this paper, I do include 
the ‘dynamic capability’ view that developed later (Teece et al. 1997, Dosi et al. 2000), 
and that did focus on learning and innovation. In particular, I include a branch of the 
capability view is that of the ‘knowledge based’ theory of the firm that emphasizes 
capabilities in the form of knowledge (Kogut and Zander 1992, Quinn 1992, Nooteboom 
1992, Zollo and Winter 2002).  
Teece et al. (2000: 339) proposed that ‘Dynamic capabilities .. reflect an 
organization’s ability to achieve new and innovative forms of competitive advantage 
despite path dependencies and core rigidities in the firm’s organizational and technical 
processes’. So far, the literature has offered limited insight in how that is done, and this 
forms the focus of my cognitive theory of the firm. Part of that is included in this paper.  
 
 
Organizational cognitive focus 
 
Using elements from definitions from McKelvey (1982) and Aldrich (1999), I define 
organizations is as follows: 
 
Organizations are myopically goal-directed, socially constructed, more or less focused 
systems of coordinated activities or capabilities.   
 
The notion of organizational goals is problematic (Scott 1992). When are goals 
personal and when collective? Are goals those of an entrepreneur, of managers, or of 
some ‘dominant coalition’ (Cyert and March 1963)? Avoiding that issue, in the present 
paper, I assume that organizations do have goals, emerging from guidance by 
entrepreneurs, response and initiative from others, in multiple interactions, within and 
between firms. Personal goals are different from organizational ones, but they may be,   6
and for viable organizational membership should be, aligned, in part, with organizational 
goals. 
Organizational cognition also has its problems. Cognition as mental activity by 
definition cannot apply to aggregates such as firms or organizations. However, such 
aggregates can be seen as engaging in the use and production of knowledge, and people 
in an organization can share views, interpretations, understandings, values and norms of 
behaviour, which are not shared outside the organization, in organizations as ‘systems of 
shared meanings’ or ‘interpretation systems’ (Smircich 1983, Schein 1985, Weick and 
Roberts 1993, Weick 1995, Cook and Yanow 1996). Here, I use the notion of 
organizational cognitive focus (Nooteboom 1992, 1999). Guided and constrained by 
organizational focus, people in organizations may accept organizational goals, and 
contribute to their elaboration, maintenance, drift or shift, as an outcome of interaction 
between them, and between the organization and its environment. Initially, at their 
founding, firms carry a strong imprint, in both goals and cognitive focus, from the 
founding entrepreneur(s). Subsequently, both goals and focus are subject to 
reconstruction and change as the outcome of interactions in the firm. This is indicated by 
the term ‘socially constructed’ in the definition of organizations. The ‘more or less 
focused’ nature of these systems refers to the condition that organizational focus can be 
more or less encompassing and cohesive. The features of organizational focus are 
elaborated later.  
Goal direction of organizations is ‘myopic’ for several reasons. First, individual 
cognition is ‘bounded’ in that it is contingent upon mental categories that both enable and 
constrain cognition, and arise from experience along specific life trajectories. In this 
‘activity based’, ‘embodied’ cognition, insights, preferences and goals do guide action, 
but they are also constructed from it, and then follow rather than preceed action (Weick 
1979). This makes cognition bounded not only in the sense that one has a limited capacity 
for rational evaluation, but in the more fundamental sense that one’s perspective is biased 
by experience and subject to unforeseeable development. In organizations, individual 
cognition is further guided and constrained by organizational focus. And finally, shifts of 
goals and focus of organizations are emergent, and hence unforeseebale, outcomes of 
complex interactions between people. In this process there arise discrepancies between 
official ‘espoused’ organizational goals, and actual goals ‘in use’ (Argyris and Schön 
1974).  
There is a range of possible goals, such as survival, profit, social or political 
legitimation, competitive strength, political influence, creativity, freedom or 
independence. Achievement of goals requires coordination of actions, using means 
according to relevant know-how, under external commercial and institutional conditions. 
Know-how includes individual-level and group-level capabilities, in skills and knowledge 
that may be technical, organizational and behavioural, and organization-level capabilities 
to configure and coordinate them. There is, in general, a multitude of ways to select and 
configure goals, actions, means, know-how and external conditions. Coordination of 
specific activities is not necessarily only a task of management, and may arise on other 
levels, by plan and design or more spontaneously. Coordination may be achieved by 
assigning capabilities to jobs, assigning people to jobs, thereby defining the roles they 
have in the organization, and defining and governing relations between them. Here, 
Mintzberg (1983) proposed five forms of coordination: specification of outputs,   7
processes, capabilities, direct supervision and mutual adjustment. Later, Mintzberg 
(1989: 221) added a ‘missionary form’, in coordination by ideology.  
In these configurations of goals, actions, means, know-how and external conditions, 
choice is needed. One cannot strive for everything at the same time. One cannot look in 
all directions at the same time, and if it were possible, one would probably see nothing. In 
other words, there is a need for focus on goals, actors and actions, means and know-how, 
and on how to configure and coordinate them under what conditions. The ability to do 
that constitutes organizational capability. The central difference between firm and market 
is that in the former such focus is made and in the latter it is not, or to a much lesser 
extent (there still is a remaining, shared cognitive focus from shared culture). Thus the 
market has the higher potentiality of variety of performance, and the firm has the higher 
actuality of performance.  
 
The Need for Focus 
 
Focus means limitation of a range, of activity, ownership, attention, meaning or 
capability. Then, organizational focus can mean limitation of its range of activities, in 
terms of products, markets and technologies, of physical, cognitive or cultural assets, of 
individual or organizational capabilities, or a combination of all of those.  
Many firms still define themselves in terms of specific activities, but as the pace of 
change of knowledge, technologies and markets increases, firms are learning to shift their 
focus from a given range of activities, products, production processes, physical assets, 
distribution channels and the like, to a focus of underlying capabilities that have the 
potential of generating and supporting a variety of products and production processes 
(Quinn 1982, 1992). This yields greater flexibility to adapt to changing markets and 
technologies with changing product lines and production processes. That was also one of 
the essential points made by Penrose (1959). Capabilities (resources) can be applied to a 
variety of specific activities (‘services’).  
Next, and beyond Penrose, there is increasing pressure to narrow the focus of 
capabilities to those ‘core capabilities’ in which firms can maintain durable competitive 
advantage. Such focus yields a further increase of flexibility, in a wider scope for more 
variable configurations of the firm’s capabilities with those of other firms. It also 
improves their distinction with respect to other firms, with the usual consideration, from 
industrial economics, that differentiation yields higher profitability than price competition 
with highly substitutable products. I will argue that such focus also increases speed of 
innovation, which is vital under increasing competition in all dimensions, of price, 
quality and innovation. It also increases cognitive diversity, in collaboration between 
firms, as a source of innovation (Nooteboom 1992). Also, the external configuration of 
capabilities between firms is enabled by new technical opportunities, from information 
and communication technology, and emerging organizational capabilities, in the 
coordination of activities between firms. I will argue that, in contrast with Penrose 
(1959), all this yields limits to the size of firms.  
For any given focus of capabilities, in order to profit from complementarities between 
them cognitive coordination is needed on their interfaces, in the wide sense of cognition 
used here, to enable sufficient mutual understanding and ability to collaborate 
(competence), and willingness and commitment to do so (governance). Such alignment of   8
cognition requires what I call ‘organizational cognitive focus’. I propose that this 
constitutes a central organizational capability. 
Note that in cognitive coordination not everyone has to have the same ideas on 
everything. In fact, it may even be that there is not a single idea shared by all. Diversity 
of ideas is good for innovation, and autonomy and room for initiative are often good for 
motivation. So, one should aim for minimum alignment of cognition needed to utilize 
opportunities from complementary capabilities. Variety of cognition should be limited 
only when needed for the feasibility and efficiency of collaboration. 
On the competence side, focus is needed to enable people to understand each other 
and connect complementary knowledge, without unduly restricting variety and creativity. 
On the governance side, focus is needed to motivate people to collaborate and share and 
connect knowledge, without unduly restricting autonomy, ambition and competitive 
spirit. Next to coordination, organizational focus also has functions of selection and 
adaptation. In selection, it selects people, in recruitment and often on the basis of self-
selection of personnel joining the organization because they feel affinity with it. In 
adaptation, it socializes incoming personnel, with initiation, and focuses their capabilities, 
in training 
 
Features of Focus 
 
The question is how far organizational focus goes, or should go. Both inside and outside 
organizations, people have more goals, capabilities, roles and relations than those that are 
governed by organizational focus (Dimaggio 1997). Ring and van de Ven (1994) made a 
distinction between organizational roles people play and their behaviour ‘qua persona’. 
This was presaged by the distinction Simmel (1950[1917]) made between a person’s 
function in an organization, which takes up only part of his personality, and his full 
personality. So, one question is how far organizational focus reaches in affecting actions 
of people. Berger and Luckmann (1966) distinguished between primary socialization in 
family, as one grows up, and, building on that and molding it further, secondary 
socialization in places of work.  
The content and extent of cognitive alignment in in organizations may vary. In 
addition to the distinction between the competence and governance sides of focus, there 
are five dimensions for both. First, there is width, i.e. the range of different areas of 
competence and governance in a firm to which focus applies. This depends on the range 
of capabilities that a firm encompasses. Second, there is reach, i.e. the number of aspects 
within each area covered by the focus. Does it affect all or only some key aspects of a 
given capability? A third dimension is tightness versus looseness, i.e. narrowness of 
tolerance levels of standards or rules imposed by focus, versus allowance for slack and 
ambiguity, with improvised, unforeseen meanings, actions, etc. 
Fourth, focus may have different content. In particular, on the governance side it may 
be formal, i.e. depersonalized, norms of legitimacy, which regulate what managers and 
workers can legitimately do and can expect from each other. Such norms render relations 
more impersonal and thereby reduce tensions associated with the exercise of personal 
power, and they enlist workers to participate in the control of their colleagues (Scott 
1992: 306). The content of focus may also be more cultural, in the sense of offering 
guidance by more emotion-laden underlying values, expressed in symbolic entities,   9
behaviours, events or processes. The two types of content are related, since norms of 
legitimacy may be expressed culturally, but can nevertheless be distinguished. One can 
have norms of legitimacy that are specified rigorously and formally, and one can have 
more informal, ambiguous, cultural features that go beyond norms of legitimacy. 
Fifth, focus may relate to surface regulations concerning specific actions or to 
underlying more fundamental notions, in a deep structure of logic, principles or cognitive 
categories that form the basis for surface regulation. Simon (1976) already acknowledged 
that an organization controls not decisions but their premises. Nelson and Winter (1982) 
made a similar distinction, between routines and ‘meta-routines’ that guide the 
development of routines. As already indicated, Mintzberg (1989) allowed for 
‘missionary’ organizations. Schein (1985) made a similar distinction in organizational 
culture. Below surface features such as specific rules, practices, symbols, myths, rituals, 
at the basis of organizational culture lie fundamental views and intuitions regarding the 
relation between the firm and its environment (‘locus of control’: is the firm master or 
victim of its environment), attitude to risk, the nature of knowledge (objective or 
constructed), the nature of man (loyal and trustworthy/self-interested or opportunistic), 
the position of man (individualistic or part of a community), and relations between people 
(rivalrous or collaborative), which inform content and process of strategy, organizational 
structure, and styles of decision-making and coordination. Schein also allowed for an 
intermediate level, connecting the fundamental cognitive categories with the surface level 
of specific structures and rules, in the form of general principles that express fundamental 
cognitive categories but are yet general and generic rather than specific to certain 
activities and contexts.  
The difference between activities, surface regulation and deep structure is 
schematically illustrated in Figure 1. Here, for simplicity of exposition, the intermediate 
level is left out. A given surface regulation enables a bundle of potential actions. An 
underlying cognitive category in deep level structure enables a bundle of surface level 
regulation. The establishment of coordination on the surface level (routines, if one wants 
to use that term) leaves freedom for variety of underlying cognitive categories, but has to 
be set up ad hoc each time, and requires the solution of complications due to differences 
in underlying cognition. The establishment of coordination on the deep level yields more 
ex ante agreement for setting up surface regulation, and thus enhances speed of action, 
but it reducers variety of cognition on the deep level. It entails more indoctrination.  I will 
argue that organizations serve to coordinate on the deep level, with an advantage of easier 
and faster understanding and agreement, while collaboration between organizations 




Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------- 
 
  Nooteboom (1999) employed the notion of ‘cognitive distance’, i.e. differences in 
cognition between people. The concept entails a distinction between reducing and 
crossing cognitive distance. Reducing cognitive distance entails alignment on the deep 
level of cognition, so that people think more similarly. Crossing cognitive distance is   10
making surface agreements while maintaining differences on the deep level, with people 
continuing to think differently. When people who think differently continue interaction, 
starting from surface agreements, they may in time come to think more similarly, i.e. 





If capabilities are connected between A and B, and between B and C, and not between A 
and C, there is a need for A and B to have some cognition in common, and for B and C, 
but there may be no need for A and C to have anything in common. This situation may 
arise in sequential interdependence (Thompson 1967). Under pooled interdependence 
(ibid.), B, C and D may all share a common resource A, as a resource they tap from, or a 
resource they contribute to, in a ‘star’ or ‘hub and spokes’ configuration. Here they must 
all have some cognition in common with A, but not necessarily with each other.  
Why would such arrangements have to take place within an organization? This is the 
classic question, ever since transaction cost economics, of why the firm exists as an 
organization that integrates different activities or capabilities. Why not have autonomous, 
independent capabilities, and set up sufficient mutual understanding and agreement 
between them ad hoc, only when the need arises?  
One reason for integration in a firm is technical complexity and systemic coherence. 
A system of production is systemic or complex to the extent that there are (1) many 
components that are (2) densely connected in ties of complementarity, which are strong 
in that connections concern a wide range (3) of actions with (4) narrow tolerances on 
interfaces in order to preserve systemic coherence. As a consequence, in a complex 
system a small local change, in some component, may trigger multiple changes 
elsewhere, reverberating through the system, to yield a very different configuration.  
This well-known principle from systems theory has been revived in recent literature 
(Teece 1986, Langlois and Robertson 1995, Levinthal 2000, Postrel 2002) because of its 
importance for the stability of organizational systems and for differences between firms 
within an industry.  
More systemic coherence requires more cohesiveness of focus. A greater number of 
components requires greater width of focus, a wider range of interaction requires a 
greater reach of focus, and narrower tolerances require greater strictness of focus. A less 
cohesive focus, in a de-coupled system, may yield loss of efficiency, but has dynamic 
advantages. It facilitates the outsourcing of components and the keeping of only 
components that include the organization’s core capabilities and complementary 
resources that are inseparable from them. It increases the scope and variety of possible 
linkages, and greater flexibility in the configuration of activities or capabilities. One form 
of decoupling is modularization, i.e. by re-composing the system in components with a 
one-to-one correspondence with function and/or capability, and with standards on the 
interfaces between component activities (cf. Langlois and Robertson 1995).  
A second point, to be considered here, is derived from the notion of specific 
investments from TCE (transaction cost economics). If the set-up of sufficient cognitive 
alignment constitutes a specific investment, which cannot be used in other linkages, it is 
only efficient to make it under the prospect of sufficient duration or intensity of   11
utilization to recoup the specific investment. Especially when the knowledge involved is 
tacit, the building of understanding takes time, in shared practice, and it is likely to be 
fairly specific to the linkage involved. This has an implication for the durability of 
linkages, but not yet for a durable combination of different capabilities within an 
organization. Collaborative relationships that are sufficiently durable to build up and 
utilize mutual understanding may also be achieved between rather than only within 
organizations (Nooteboom 1999).  
A third, more crucial, cognitive, argument for integration of capabilities within an 
organization derives from Schumpeter. Novel entrepreneurial ideas typically do not make 
sense in an established institutional order of dominant ideas, routines, recipes, logics and 
practices, in an industry (Spender 1989, Bettis and Prahalad 1995). Here, organization 
yields a sheltered niche for deviance of ideas that cannot be traded or connected outside, 
due to lack of comprehension, and need to be configured within the organization, on the 
basis of entrepreneurial vision and charisma to inspire followers.  
A fourth point for organization, which applies also to firms with an established, 
recognized position, is the following. The whole point of moving from specific activities 
to more generic capabilities, derived from Penrose, and indicated above, was to obtain 
more scope for novel activities, in novel uses of capabilities, and thereby have more 
flexibility to respond to increasingly rapid changes of threat and opportunity, in 
technology and markets. Now novel utilization of capabilities and the new configurations 
of capabilities to which this is likely to lead, requires renewed investment in mutual 
understanding and ability to collaborate, if that was not already in place. That, however, 
takes time, particularly when the knowledge involved is more tacit. As a result, to 
maintain scope and flexibility for novel utilization, and hence novel combinations, of 
capabilities, it pays to have a further reaching, more cohesive scope of mutual 
understanding, and ability and willingness to collaborate, already in place, beyond 
linkages that are currently operational. This is an argument of speed and flexibility. To 
warrant and utilize such wider sharing of cognition, across not only actual but also 
potential, unpredictable new linkages, plus the need for a certain duration to achieve and 
utilize the investment involved, yields an argument for organization, with a range of 
capabilities that are more tightly and durably aligned by organizational cognitive focus. 
For the more ad hoc investment in linkages as the need or opportunity arises, 
organizations can employ inter-organizational alliances.  
The cognitive argument for organization can be further sharpened with an analysis of 
the depth of cognitive focus. For the same reason that a focus on capabilities yields more 
scope and flexibility of activities than a focus on activities, cognitive alignment in deep 
structure rather than in surface regulation is more generative and flexible, yielding a 
wider scope of capabilities. This was illustrated in Figure 1. To use a metaphor, 
fundamental mental categories are like the roots of a tree, largely invisible in the 
subconscious, capabilities are like the branches, and activities are like leaves and 
blossoms that appear, die off, and re-appear. Deep level cohesiveness is more tacit than 
surface level rules, and hence requires more time to develop and is more specific, 
requiring longer time to recoup as an investment, and therefore is more a feature of 
organizations than of inter-organizational relationships that, on the whole, tend to be less 
durable, less cohesive and more superficially coordinated.    12
There is another reason for coordination on a deep level, especially on the governance 
side. That lies in the condition that work has become increasingly knowledge intensive, 
professional, and abstract, and thereby more difficult for management to monitor and 
evaluate, let alone measure. This makes rule- and contract based control more difficult, 
and creates an advantage for more intrinsic motivation that requires less monitoring and 
control, on the basis of underlying values of conduct, or bonds of empathy, or even 
identification, and routinization, that require more time to develop and more cohesion to 
function (Nooteboom 2002).   
A more cohesive focus may also cater to the social need of people to have a sense of 
belonging. It does, however, entail more ideology and indoctrination, which also has its 
downside, in organizational myopia, group think, lack of scope for creativity, and lack of 
freedom, possibly subjugation, or even a form of serfdom. 
In sum, the most fundamental function of organizations, in contrast with inter-
organizational relations, is to provide a focus with a certain depth, for the sake of 
coordination that can quickly shift to novel patterns of activity, and for motivation that is 
more intrinsic. A cognitively and culturally more cohesive group, within an organization, 
can more quickly alter patterns of collaboration that lie within its potential. Less cohesive 
inter-firm collaboration, with more cognitive variety, has a wider scope of potential 
novelty, but requires more time, in setting up surface regulation, to utilize opportunities. I 
propose, and will later argue in more detail, that this consideration yields limits to firm 
size and yields boundaries of the firm. I will argue that as the range of capabilities to be 
coordinated increases, the resulting increase in width of focus entails an increase of reach 
and depth of focus, and that this increase of cohesiveness increasingly limits the cognitive 
variety and flexibility needed for ongoing innovation by novel combinations.   
 
Development and Stability of Focus 
 
As noted earlier, organizational focus emerges from the imprint of the entrepreneur who 
started the organization, is subject to some drift due to interaction between staff, turnover 
of staff, and due to shifts resulting from crises, caused, in particular, by shifts in the 
environment, or by new, challenging interpretations of the environment. Also, of course, 
its existence depends on population effects, in the weeding out by competitive selection. 
When resources are scarce and competition is tight, selection is likely, in the long run, to 
yield organizational cognitions and structures that reflect the exigencies of the 
environment of markets and institutions.  
An important condition for the features of focus is whether the organization engages 
in exploitation, exploration, or both. This depends on competitive opportunities and 
pressures, as a function of innovative and market turbulence in the environment, and on 
strategic choice. For exploration cognitive distance needs to be larger than for 
exploitation, with a focus with relatively little reach and strictness.  
Focus also depends on outside legal and cultural institutional conditions. In particular, 
what a firm can and needs to do in governance depends on contractual opportunities, 
norms and values of conduct, intermediaries of many kinds, political conditions, etc.  
Organizational focus cannot be integrally and instantly re-shaped as a function of 
experience in competition, and to a greater or lesser extent this yields organizational 
stability or even inertia (Hannan and Freeman 1989). Such stability is a well-established   13
empirical phenomenon. In their study of large firms Patel and Pavitt (2000: 317) found 
that: ‘90% of firms have profiles of technological competence that are statistically similar 
between 1969-74 and 1985-90’ which ‘remains true even after taking account of 
acquisitions and divestments’, and ‘.. of 41 of the largest firms only one had a 
technological profile statistically different’.  
There are several reasons for stability of organizational identity and focus. One 
reason is systemic. As indicated before, in a complex system, with many tight linkages 
between components, change in any element may endanger systemic integrity, and would 
then require multiple changes elsewhere in the system, to arrive at a new feasible 
configuration.  
A second reason is that cognitive focus yields absorptive capacity (Cohen and 
Levinthal 1990) that tends to mostly confirm itself in its functioning (imprinting). Ways 
of seeing and making inferences yield habits that are relegated to subsidiary awareness, in 
routinization. However, while there is inertia, firms may be able to escape from it, on the 
basis of appropriate dynamic capabilities. However, that subject cannot be discussed 
within the confines of the present paper.  
Cultural identity and cognitive focus are maintained, in spite of turnover and 
exchange of staff, because in the entry into an organization there is, as noted before, self-
selection according to expected fit to organizational culture, as well as adaptation by 
socialization into organizational culture, in introductory courses, meetings or rituals, and 
ostracism of those who do not conform. Furthermore, according to the idea of 
intelligence as internalized action the further development of cognition reflects the 
environment, in this case the organization, in which it takes place.  
 
Levels of Organization 
 
Generally, organizational focus will be narrowest in single-person, owner-manager firms, 
wider in work groups, wider yet in larger firms consisting of multiple groups, and widest 
in multi-divisional firms, as a function of the diversity of capabilities involved.  
  In a single-person owner-manager firm, by definition cognitive distance is zero. 
There, organizational focus is inclusive. Personal life and business are highly interwoven. 
This arises in finance, with personal or family capital, profits as a source of personal 
income, and business risk as a personal risk. It often arises in housing, with the firm 
located at the home. It also arises in the goals of the firm. Organizational goals are more 
varied and more personal in small firms. Self-employed people may flee from the 
authority imposed by employers, they may take refuge in self-employment from 
unemployment due to economic crisis combined with lack of social employment benefits, 
or discrimination of race, ethnicity or gender in labour markets. They may seek 
independence as a goal in itself or to achieve the opportunity to implement deviant ideas, 
satisfy personal preferences concerning niche products, or small-scale production with 
informal relationships and absence of bureaucracy.  
The small firm often has a limited portfolio of capabilities, yielding a limited range of 
technologies, products and competencies. As a result, small firms are vulnerable, with 
limited diversification of risks, limited specialization in functions, limited economies of 
scale and scope, and limited career perspectives for personnel. They also have both the 
potential advantages and disadvantages of a cohesive focus, in thick and tight, often highly   14
personalized relationships, with limited division of labour. High cohesiveness may also 
result from the cognitive stamp that the entrepreneur puts on his small organization, where 
he interacts directly with his personnel. In this way, radically innovative, small firms may 
isolate themselves and thereby close themselves off from the sources of application and 
further innovation.  
This yields one of several paradoxes of the small firm. On the one hand, small size, with 
personalized, thick, informal relationships, integration of tasks among few people, and 
direct contacts, internally and outside, e.g. with customers, enables high flexibility and 
motivational power of identification with the firm. On the other hand there is potential for 
suppression of freedom and variety, and of isolation from the environment (cf. Nooteboom 
1994).  
In larger firms, especially distance in job-related competence is larger, in a wider and 
deeper division of labor, but distance on the moral side of cognition is not necessarily 
larger than in a small firm. In fact, since in face-to-face work groups there is more 
informal, spontaneous social control of free-ridership (Simmel 1950[1917]), in the small 
firm the need for a more explicit moral focus is less. In larger organizations more 
attention may be needed to the moral dimension of organizational focus across different 
work communities. A difference in culture between large and small firms lies in the fact 
that with a more extensive division of labor, with coordination between greater numbers 
of people across possibly distant organizational units, knowledge and rules need to be 
codified to a greater extent than in small firms, where coordination can take place by 
direct supervision (Mintzberg 1983). 
 
 
Limits to Size and Growth of the Firm 
 
Are there limits to the size of a firm? Penrose (1959) claimed that there are none. Firms can 
grow by diversification and by employing new services that belong to the potential of 
existing resources and their configurations. However, in ongoing growth at some point new 
capabilities have to be added. I expect that there are limits to size because under increase of 
the range of capabilities, the organization faces a fundamental trade-off between variety 
and coordination. Either variety is maintained at the expense of coordination, and then the 
question arises why the elements should be part of single firm rather than being 
independent, or coordination is maintained at the expense of variety, which reduces 
innovative potential. I now proceed to analyze the issue in more detail. 
  If the number of capabilities, and resources more generally, is n, then the number of 
possible connections between them is n(n-1)/2, and thus increases quadratically in n, if 
everything remains connected with everything else, yielding an accelerating increase of 
costs, including opportunity costs, of coordination, and, probably, noise in communication. 
This, of course, yields a classic reason for decomposition, in hierarchies or network 
structures such as, for example, a hub and spokes structure. Capabilities are clustered in 
local units, such as communities of practice, which are in turn connected in divisions of 
firms, which are in turn connected in corporations. Is there a limit to this?  
From the present cognitive perspective, problems of coordination increase with the 
dissimilarity of connected capabilities, within the different levels of organization. Also, 
empirical research by Nooteboom et al. (2005) showed a principle of decreasing returns to   15
knowledge. As knowledge accumulates, further novelty has to be sought at increasingly 
greater cognitive distance. As a result, as capabilities accumulate, the dissimilarity of novel 
capabilities increases, thus increasing problems of collaboration.  
The costs of coordination are not just direct costs, but also opportunity costs of loss of 
cognitive variety, in the fact that in establishing mutual understanding, and willingness to 
collaborate, across an increasingly heterogeneous batch of capabilities, each of them gets 
more constrained in its idiosyncracies of cognition. The paradoxical result then arises that 
while potential variety increases in terms of the scope of capabilities, in each of them actual 
variety decreases due to rising needs of common understanding. One alternative, to prevent 
escalation of costs and complexity of coordination, is to leave potential connections 
unutilised, but then the question arises why unconnected capabilities should be combined in 
a single firm. 
This brings me close to Richardson’s (1972, 1999) position that activities should be 
combined within a firm to the extent that they are similar and complementary, and should 
be relegated to outside relations to the extent that they are not. However, the analysis can 
be further refined.   
A further question is whether coordination should be limited to surface level regulation, 
in the ad hoc coordination of specific activities when they arise. In that case, the question 
again is why that would be more efficient inside than between firms. Such ad hoc 
regulation has to be made anew each time that activities are re-configured. With a lack of 
deeper cognitive alignment, this takes time, in a working out of differences in cognition, in 
competence and governance. A faster alternative to ad hoc surface regulation is to build up 
a store of surface regulations that one might draw from as the need for any them appears. 
However, it may be difficult to predict what combinations may arise, and for each of them 
what regulations they might need. With an increasing range of potential combinations their 
number would increase, and the question arises how much of all that effort will actually be 
utilized. Thus, for surface regulation among multiple capabilities, the best would generally 
be to await what concrete activities arise and improvise coordination accordingly.  
The advantage of inclusion of a range of capabilities within one organization is that 
alignment of underlying cognition can be achieved, on a deeper, more generic level of 
cognition, yielding greater speed, scope and flexibility of generating surface regulations for 
novel combinations. The (specific) investment in such focus is worthwhile for its 
perspective, within a firm, for intensive and repeated utilization. Here is a remnant of TCE 
logic.  
However, there are several drawbacks to this. First, it may be difficult to predict which 
capabilities will yield interesting combinations in an unknown future. Second, as the 
number of capabilities increases, cognitive alignment across all of them yields reduced 
variety in each of them, as indicated before. That effect is less to the extent that the 
capabilities and views are already more similar. Chemistry and biotechnology have more in 
common than chemistry and information technology. In other words, people can easily 
coordinate on the surface level to the extent that differences in underlying perceptions, 
views and convictions remain limited. As underlying differences increase, indoctrinating 
people with shared perceptions, views and convictions smoothes their collaboration but 
reduces their variety of cognition. 
As a result, it seems that at some point it becomes better not to bring further and more 
diverging capabilities under a single focus, and to take the alternative of employing inter-  16
firm collaboration, yielding a wider range of potential capabilities that may yield 
interesting combinations, and the preservation of more variety in each of them, and to 
engage in the more ad hoc, time consuming surface regulations for combination when and 
where the need arises. However, without constructing a shared cognitive focus on the 
competence side, integration in an organization may still be worthwhile for a shared focus 
on the governance side, in shared views on how to deal with each other. One can agree on 
that under great differences on the competence side. But that may also apply to 
collaboration between firms. Perhaps one can find, with relative ease, partners who are 
diverse in competence but like-minded on the governance side, yielding a basis for trust.  
There is yet another consideration. One may maintain cognitive distance and yet 
collaborate easily on the basis of a large absorptive capacity, and ability to collaborate more 
widely. Postrel (2002) asked when communities of practice should invest in knowing about 
each other, and when they should go their own way. On the face of it, the answer is that 
they should invest in knowing about each other when activities of different communities 
are strongly coupled, or, in other words, when activities are ‘systemic’, and that one should 
go one’s own way when activities are not or only loosely coupled, or ‘stand-alone’. Only in 
the first case it is necessary to mutually adapt activities. Postrel shows that this intuition is 
not necessarily correct. If by going their own way, and investing only in their own 
knowledge and skill, specialist communities can extend the scope and flexibility of their 
activities, then they can thereby achieve fit to whatever other communities do.  
 
------------------------------- 
Figure 2 about here 
------------------------------- 
 
The principle is illustrated in Figure 2, which is derived from Figure 1. Here, an 
increased absorptive capacity, or ability to collaborate more widely, entails that categories 
on the deep level of cognition have a widened range of applications, with more 
opportunities for surface level regulations. With a narrow range, distance between 
categories of A and B has to be small, as illustrated in the left part of the figure, in order to 
create overlap for the sake of coordination. With a wide range, on the right part of the 
figure, with a wider scope of understanding and ability to collaborate, overlap in surface 
regulation (crossing cognitive distance) is achieved at greater cognitive distance. 
In other words, having large absorptive capacity and collaborative ability, and seeking 
partners with such capacity, would reduce time and effort in achieving requisite mutual 
understanding. Thus, having high absorptive capacity, and experience in collaboration, and 
thereby being an attractive partner, becomes a key dynamic capability and competitive 
advantage. This applies both within and between firms. So, a firm might integrate a great 
variety of competence and deal with it on the basis of large absorptive capacity and ability 
to collaborate, in the units that may need to connect with others, with ability to collaborate 
further supported by an organizational focus only on the governance side.  
However, that takes time, in an accumulation of knowledge, for absorptive capacity, 
and of experience in collaboration with people who think differently, for ability to 
collaborate. Also, recall that accumulation of knowledge yields the requirement of partners 
at increasing cognitive distance to learn something new, which may then further contribute 
to a widening of variety within the firm, with its attendant coordination problems. In other   17
words: the solution may contribute to a worsening of the problem. Also, having invested in 
large absorptive capacity and ability to collaborate, one would want to utilize that dynamic 
capability in a greater variety of different contacts, for which again outside relationships 
provide more scope. An example here is scholars: the ones who have accumulated most 
knowledge and most experience in collaborative research engage most in varied 
collaboration outside their university. In this way, building absorptive capacity within the 
firm, as a matter of human resource policy, may increase the problem of the most capable 
staff leaving the firm, before investment in them is recouped.  
  This rather elaborate analysis shows that it is not easy to refute Penrose. For every 
problem of firm size, a new potential solution crops up. However, it also appears that every 
time the end conclusion is that while a solution within the firm may be found, outside 
collaboration with other firms seems the better option.  
In sum, a cognitive limit to firm size appears to lie in a trade-off between coordination 
and variety of cognition. The advantage of an organization is that by alignment on deeper 
levels of cognition it affords easier and faster coordination on the surface level of specific 
combinations of capabilities, but it does so at the price of reducing cognitive variety. In 
other words, organization tends to improve exploitation at the expense of exploration. The 
alternative is to engage in slower, more ad hoc, surface level adjustment while preserving 
cognitive variety, and the potential for that is greatest in outside collaboration with other 
firms. There may be ways out of this. While maintaining cognitive variety on the 
competence side organizations may still have a comparative advantage in providing a 
cognitive focus on the governance side. This applies most in low-trust environments, where 
indeed organization is most needed for a focus on the governance side. Another option to 
maintain both cognitive diversity and ease and speed of cognitive coordination is to build 
and maintain large absorptive capacity and ability to collaborate within the organization. 
But this requires considerable investment in the accumulation of knowledge and 
experience, and the question arises whether it would not be more attractive to extend the 
utilization of such dynamic capability in a greater variety of contacts, outside the 
organization.   
 
Limits to Growth 
 
To coordinate an increasingly complex whole of capabilities, one needs a sufficiently 
wide, far reaching and tight cognitive focus, especially on the normative, governance side 
to maintain ability and willingness to collaborate across such diversity of competence, 
often across diverse locations, in different cultural settings. This requires a certain 
strength and sophistication of organizational culture that requires time to develop as well 
as time for incoming staff to find their way and to adjust. Next to obstacles to size, this 
yields an obstacle to the speed of growth, which comes close to the limit to the rate of 
growth identified by Penrose.  
  Another limit to the rate of growth lies in the building up of absorptive capacity and 
ability to collaborate, as a dynamic capability to profit from wider cognitive variety, 
inside and outside the firm.  
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Conclusion 
 
Penrose’ s (1959) theory of the firm, and particularly her underlying view of knowledge 
as constructed, yielding ‘cognitive distance’ between people, stimulates an analysis of 
organizational learning and resource creation that goes beyond her own theory. The 
present paper, utilizing an emerging cognitive theory of the firm, suggests that the 
fundamental role of organizations is to provide a cognitive focus in order to utilize 
complementarities between different capabilities. However, there is a trade-off involved 
with the alternative of profiting from capabilities between different organizations. While 
within firm coordination on the basis of cognitive focus yields an advantage of easy and 
fast coordination, it yields a disadvantage of reduced cognitive variety. Conversely, 
between firm coordination is slower and more laborious, but has the advantage of 
offering a wider scope of possible combinations. The trade-off point between the two lies 
in the cognitive distance between the capabilities involved: firms serve for lower 
distance, and inter-firm collaboration serves for larger distance. Essentially, this confirms 
Richardson’s view.  
  An important dynamic capability identified in the analysis is the ability for mutual 
understanding (absorptive capacity) and ability to collaborate, for crossing cognitive 
distance, to utilize opportunities for combining different competencies. From the 
perspective of a cognitive theory of the firm there is much more to be said about dynamic 
capabilities, but that is beyond the scope of the present paper.  
 




1999  Organizations evolving. London: Sage. 
 
Argyris, Chris and Donald Schön 
1974  Theory in practice: Increasing professional effectiveness. San Francisco: Jossey-
Bass. 
 
Best, Michael H.  
2002  ‘Regional growth dynamics: a capabilities perspective’, in C. Pitelis (Ed.) The 
growth of the firm; The legacy of Edith Penrose, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 
179-195. 
 
Bettis, R. A. and C. K. Prahalad 
1995  ‘The dominant logic: retrospective and extension’, Strategic Management Journal,  
16/1, 5 - 14. 
 
Boulding, Kenneth E. 
1956  The image. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
 
Cantwell, John 
2002  ‘Innovation, profits and growth: Penrose and Schumpeter’, in C. Pitelis, The 
growth of the firm; The legacy of Edith Penrose, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 
215-248. 
 
Cohen, Michael D. and Dan A. Levinthal 
1990  ‘Absorptive capacity: A new perspective on learning  and innovation’. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 35: 128-52. 
 
Cook, Scott and Dvora Yanow 
1996  ‘Culture and organizational learning’, in M. D. Cohen and L. S. Sproull eds. 1996. 
Organizational Learning, London, Sage, 430-435; first printed in Journal of 
Management Enquiry, 2/4,1993 
 
Cyert, Richard M. and James G. March 
1963  A behavioral theory of the firm. Englewood Cliffs NJ: Prentice-Hall 
 
DiMaggio, Paul J. 
1997  ‘Culture and cognition’, Annual Review of Sociology, 23: 263-287. 
 
Dosi, Giovanni, Richard R. Nelson and SidneyG. Winter (Eds.) 
2000  The nature and dynamics of organizational capabilities, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press  
 
Foss, Nicolai J.   20
2002  Edith Penrose: economics and strategic management, in C. Pitelis, The growth of   
the firm; The legacy of Edith Penrose, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 147-164. 
 
Ghoshal, Sumantra, Martin Hahn and Peter Moran 
2002  ‘Management competence, firm growthy and economic progress’, in C. Pitelis, 
The growth of the firm; The legacy of Edith Penrose, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press: 279-309. 
 
Hannan, Michael and J. Freeman 
1977  ‘The population ecology of organizations’. American Journal of Sociology, 88: 
929-964. 
 
Hannan, Michael and John Freeman 
1989  Organizational ecology. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
Hayek, Friedrich A. von 
1945  ‘The use of knowledge in society’, American Economic Review, 35, September: 
519-530. 
 
Kogut, Bruce and Udo Zander 
1992  ‘Knowledge of the firm, combinative capabilities, and the replication of 
technology’, Organization Science, 3: 383- 397. 
 
Langlois, Richard N. and Paul L. Robertson 
1995  Firms, markets and economic change, London: Routledge. 
 
Lazonick, William 
2002  ‘The US industrial corporation and The theory of the growth of the firm, in C. 
Pitelis, The growth of the firm; The legacy of Edith Penrose, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press: 249-278. 
 
Levinthal, Daniel A. 
2000  ‘Organizational capabilities in complex worlds’. in: G. Dosi, R.R. Nelson and S.G. 
Winter, (Eds.), The nature and dynamics of organizational capabilities, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press: 363-379. 
 
Loasby, Brian 
2002  ‘The significance of Penroses theory for the development of economics’, in C. 
Pitelis (Ed.) The growth of the firm; The legacy of Edith Penrose, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press: 45-60. 
 
March, James G. 
1991  ‘Exploration and exploitation in organizational learning’. Organization Science, 
2/1: 101-123. 
 
McKelvey, William   21
1982  Organizational systematics: Taxonomy, evolution, classification. Berkeley: 
University of California Press. 
 
Mintzberg, Henry 




1989  Mintzberg on management. New York: The Free Press. 
 
Nelson Richard R. and Sidney Winter 
1982  An evolutionary theory of economic change. Cambridge: Cambridge University  
    Press. 
 
Nooteboom, Bart 




1994  ‘Innovation and diffusion in small business: Theory and empirical evidence’, Small 
Business Economics, 6: 327-347.  
 
Nooteboom, Bart 
1999  Inter-firm alliances: Analysis and design. London: Routledge. 
 
Nooteboom, Bart 




2002  Trust: Forms, foundations, functions, failures and figures, Cheltenham UK: 
Edward Elgar. 
 
Nooteboom, Bart, Wim P.M. van Haverbeke, Geert M. Duysters, Victor A. Gilsing and 
Ad van den Oord  
2005  Optimal cognitive distance and absorptive capacity, paper under review.  
 
Patel, Pari and Keith Pavitt  
1997  ‘The technological competencies of the world’s largest firms: complex and path- 
    dependent, but not much variety’, Research Policy, 26: 141-156.  
 
Patel, Pari and Keith Pavitt 
1999 [1998] ‘The wide (and increasing) spread of technological competencies in the 
worlds largest firms: A challenge to conventional wisdom’. In A.D. Chandler, P. 
Hagström  and  Ö.  Sölvell  (Eds.)  The  dynamic  firm;  The  role  of  technology, 
strategy, organizations, and regions. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 192-213. 
   22
Patel, Pari and Keith Pavitt 
2000  How technological competences help define the core not the boundaries of the 
firm in: G. Dosi, R.R. Nelson and S.G. Winter, Eds., 2000, The nature and 
dynamics of organizational capabilities, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 313-333. 
 
Penrose, Edith 
1959  The theory of the growth of the firm, New York: Wiley 
 
Pitelis, Christos (Ed.) 
2002  The growth of the firm, the legacy of Edith Penrose. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Porter, Michael E. 
1980  Competitive strategy. New York: The Free Press. 
 
Porter, Miachel E. 
1985  Competitive advantage. New York: The Free Press. 
 
Postrel, Steven 
2002  ‘Islands of shared knowledge: Specialization and mutual understanding in 
problem-solving teams’, Organization Science, 13/3: 303-320. 
 
Quinn, James B. 
1992  Intelligent enterprise, New York: the Free Press. 
 
Richardson, G.B. 
1972  ‘The organization of industry’. Economic Journal, 82: 883-896. 
 
Richardson, G.B. 




2002  Mrs. Penrose and neoclassical theory, in C. Pitelis (Ed), The growth of the firm; 
The legacy of Edith Penrose, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 37-44. 
 
Ring, Peter S. and Andrew van de Ven 
1994  ‘Developmental processes of cooperative interorganizational relationships.’ 
Academy of Management Review, 19/1: 90 - 118. 
 
Schein, Edgar H. 
1985  Organizational culture and leadership. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass 
 
Schumpeter, Joseph A. 
1934  Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, London: Unwin. 
   23
Schumpeter, Joseph A. 
1909  Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung, Leipzig: Duncker und Humblot. 
 
Scott, W. Richard 
1992 [1981] Organizations; Rational, natural, and open systems, 3
rd edition, Englewood  
    Cliffs NJ: Prentice-Hall. 
 
Simmel, Georg 
1950[1917] The sociology of Georg Simmel, Translation Kurt Wolff, Glencoe Ill.: The 
    Free Press.  
 
Simon, Herbert A. 
1976  Administrative behavior. (3
rd. edition) New York: Free Press. 
 
Smircich, Linda 
1983  ‘Organization as shared meaning’, in L. R. Pondy, P. J. Frost, G. Morgan and T. C. 
Dandridge eds., Organizational symbolism, Greenwich Conn: JAI Press: 55 - 65. 
 
Spender, J. C. 
1989  Industry recipes. Oxford: Basil Blackwell 
 
Teece, David J. 
1986  ‘Profiting  from  technological  innovation:  Implications  for  integration, 
collaboration, licensing and public policy’. Research Policy, 15: 285 - 305. 
 
Teece, David J., Gary Pisano and Amy Shuen 
  2000  ‘Dynamic capabilities and strategic management’ in: G. Dosi, R.R. Nelson and S.G 
   Winter, Eds., 2000, The nature and dynamics of organizational capabilities, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press: 334-362 
 
Weick, Karl F. 
1979 [1969]  The social psychology of organizing, Reading, MA: Addison - Wesley. 
 
Weick, Karl F. 
1995  Sensemaking in organisations, Thousand Oaks CA: Sage. 
 
Weick, Karl F. and Karlene H. Roberts 
1993  ‘Collective mind in organizations’. Administrative Science Quartery, 39, reprinted  
in  Michael D. Cohen and L. S. Sproull Eds. 1996, Organizational learning 
London: Sage: 330-358.. 
 
Zollo, Maurizio and Sidney G. Winter 
2002  ‘Deliberate learning and the evolution of dynamic capabilities’, Organization 
Science, 13/3: 339-351. 
   24
Figure 1  Levels of coordination 
 



















Figure 2  Absorptive and collaborative capacity 
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